This paper presents a kernelized architecture i.e., an architecture in which no subject is exempted from the simple-security and ?-properties for multilevel secure mls objectoriented database management systems DBMS's which support write-up. Relational mls DBMS's typically do not allow write-up, due to integrity problems arising from the blind nature of write-up operations in these systems. In object-oriented DBMS's, on the other hand, sending messages upwards in the security lattice does not present a n i n tegrity problem because such messages will be processed by appropriate methods in the destination object. However, supporting write-up operations in object-oriented systems is complicated by the fact that such operations are no longer primitive; but can be arbitrarily complex and therefore can take arbitrary amounts of processing time. We focus on support for remote procedure call RPC based write-up operations. Dealing with the timing of such write-up operations consequently has broad implications on con dentiality due to the possibility o f signaling channels, integrity, and performance.
Introduction
The object-oriented paradigm continues to emerge as a useful and unifying one in computer science. It has borrowed ideas from such diverse elds as software engineering, arti cial intelligence, and databases, and in turn advanced these elds in new directions. In light of this, we have seen several research and development e orts in object-oriented databases. The impetus for these developments can be attributed to emerging applications and computing environments that demand capabilities which are beyond those provided by record-based data models and conventional database technologies. Such applications and environments include computer-aided design, o ce automation, and cooperative work. From a data modeling perspective, object-oriented models not only allow the representation of complex object structures, but further allow modeling of the behavior of entities in a domain through methods encapsulated in objects.
As the object-oriented eld is still maturing, there exists no single and precise de nition of an object-oriented data model as observed by Maier 16 . However, there is some agreement on the core concepts that such a data model should support. We assume a data model that supports the following notions:
Object: An object is an instance of an abstract data type, and is thus a unit that encapsulates some chunk of private state with a public interface. Object Identity: The object identity object-id uniquely identi es an object, and is further distinct from the internal state of the object. Encapsulation of behavior: An object supports operations that are implemented by methods pieces of code. The state of an object is not directly manipulable, but can only be accessed by i n voking one of the abstract operations de ned in its public interface. Class Type: Every object belongs to a type that is determined by its class a class is akin to an abstract data type de nition. Objects with the same structure and behavior can begrouped together as belonging to a class, thus enabling the sharing of information. Class Hierarchy: The data model should support the ability to organize classes into a class hierarchy. Classes in a hierarchy share de nitions and behavior through the mechanism of inheritance. Classes lower in the hierarchy inherit from higher super classes. The inheriting class and any corresponding instantiated object is considered to be more specialized than its superclasses.
Variations along several themes of the core ideas above h a ve been proposed in the literature. These include selective inheritance, class-less objects, and class-less sharing mechanisms such as delegation, to name a few. Discussion on some of these issues can be found in 12, 23, 26 . Although the debate on object-oriented data models continues, we fortunately do not need to settle the many issues in order to deal with multilevel con dentiality. In fact, we take a minimalist view that the dynamics of the object-oriented paradigm can essentially becaptured by encapsulation and message passing. Objects can beconsidered to be autonomous entities taking part in a distributed computation. Objects communicate with each other through messages. Message passing between objects can besynchronous or asynchronous. The receipt of a message results in the invocation of a method in the recipient object, with possible update of its state and the sending of further messages. In synchronous message passing, the sender's method is suspended until it receives a reply from the receiver object. This parallels the semantics of remote procedure calls RPC's in distributed systems.
From the security standpoint, the object-oriented model has strong appeal. In particular, there seems to be less of a modeling semantic mismatch b e t ween real-world entities in the domain being modeled and their object counterparts in the object-oriented representation. This makes it easier to specify, i n terpret, and implement access control and security policies in terms of objects rather than primitive abstractions or representations.
Recently, we have seen several models and prototypes for addressing mandatory condentiality in object-oriented databases 7, 8, 9, 14, 19, 20, 25 . A common characteristic of most of these proposals is that the security policy to beenforced is expressed as a set of properties constraints. For example, in 19 , six properties are identi ed. The rst called the hierarchy property requires that the level of an object dominate that of its class. This is required to permit inheritance along the class hierarchy. In contrast to these models, the message lter model proposed in 7 is based on the view that the task of enforcing mandatory con dentiality essentially reduces to that of controlling and ltering the exchange of messages between objects. The security policy is thus captured in a ltering algorithm and enforced by a message lter component. The main advantage of the message lter model is the simplicity and conceptual elegance with which mandatory security policies can be stated and enforced. The work we present in this paper utilizes the message lter model as its foundation.
In designing multilevel secure database management systems, one has to consider the con ict that arises between con dentiality and integrity 17 . This is because the requirements to enforce integrity constraints often result in secrecy being compromised. Conversely, guaranteeing secrecy may require tolerating lower degrees of integrity. The above tension has led to most mls relational database systems prohibiting write-up" operations. To see this, consider conventional databases such a s relational systems where the e ect of arbitrary blind write-up operations on integrity is unpredictable and uncontrollable. Thus in a multilevel relational system, there exists the potential for a low-level subject to obliterate higher-level data. There is considerable ground for optimism as we reexamine this issue within the object-oriented framework. If objects can communicate solely through messages, then the properties of encapsulation and information hiding will ensure that an object state is updated only in controllable ways. Methods invoked due to receipt of messages from lower level objects will now h a ve precise semantics.
The feasibility of supporting write-up operations is complicated by the fact that such operations are no longer primitive such as read and write, but can be arbitrarily complex and therefore can take arbitrary amounts of processing time. This has broad implications on con dentiality due to the potential for signaling channels, integrity, and e ciency. In this paper we focus on write-up actions where the intended semantics is RPC-based. The central point that we wish to make in this paper is that abstract RPC-based write-up operations can be supported in multi-level object-oriented databases while meeting the con icting goals of con dentiality, integrity, and performance. Our main contribution is an asynchronous computational model coupled with a multiversioning scheme that achieves these goals, as well as an elaboration of how this computational model can be implemented under a kernelized architecture. The computational model calls for concurrent computations to begenerated on behalf of a user session whenever messages are sent upwards in the security lattice. Multiversioning and scheduling schemes are used to ensure that such concurrent computations preserve the originally intended RPC semantics.
The kernel as in an operating system performs the lower-level functions. In a secure system, the security kernel implements the security mechanisms of the operating system. The successful application of the security kernel approach to building secure systems is based on the theory that only a small fraction of the total functions in an operating system are needed to enforce security, and that these functions can be isolated into a security kernel. We present a k ernelized architectural framework for implementing the above computational model. As there exists no trusted subjects 1 in such an architecture, the assurance of mandatory con dentiality comes directly from the operating system. Further, the absence of trusted multilevel subjects necessitates that the concurrent computations generated by a user session be scheduled and coordinated in a distributed fashion, as no system component has a global snapshot of the various computations as they progress. Database integrity now requires that these concurrent computations under distributed coordination produce the equivalent e ect as computations that are serviced sequentially. It should be noted that if write-up operations were not supported, the architecture would be straightforward, as no concurrency is involved.
We present algorithms and techniques to handle intra-session as well as inter-session concurrency. The intra-session schemes are concerned with the scheduling and execution of the computations generated within a user session. We present t wo scheduling algorithms that represent extreme points in a spectrum of conservative and aggressive strategies. We also develop a framework and a metric for the analysis of a family of scheduling algorithms, all of which preserve i n tegrity but o er varying tradeo s between complexity and performance. The inter-session schemes provide the classical database functions of concurrency control, and thus pertain to how database objects can beshared in a secure and correct manner, across multiple user sessions. We present an approach to concurrency control based on the checkin checkout paradigm. Our main objective i s t o s h o w h o w such a n i n ter-session scheme can mesh with the intra-session schemes developed in this paper. A complete treatment o f inter-session mls concurrency control is outside the scope of this paper.
The work reported in this paper advances many of the ideas presented earlier in the literature 21, 22, 24 . Initial investigations of architectural issues in 21 were followed by the study of secure signaling channel-free scheduling algorithms 22 . A conservative scheduling algorithm that required no trusted subjects for its implementation was presented in 24 . In this paper we give in addition an aggressive scheduling algorithm, followed by 1 The term trusted" is used often in the literature to convey one of two di erent notions of trust. In the rst case, it conveys the fact that something is trusted to be correct. In the second case, we mean that some subject is exempted from mandatory con dentiality controls; in particular the simple-security and ?-properties in the Bell-LaPadula framework. It is the latter sense of trust that we refer to in this paper. 
Figure 1: Objects in a payroll database a framework for comparative analysis of di erent s c heduling strategies, and nally various inter-session concurrency control schemes. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the issues addressed in this paper by means of an example. Section 3 gives an introduction to the message lter model and the ltering algorithm, and section 4 discusses a kernelized architecture. Section 5 presents the various intra-session scheduling schemes. This is followed by the inter-session concurrency control techniques in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses avenues for future research.
A Motivating Example
We motivate the usefulness of write-up operations by an illustrative example. Consider a database for payroll applications, that has three objects: EMPLOYEE Unclassi ed, WORK-INFO Unclassi ed, and PAY-INFO Secret, with the attributes shown in gure 1. In other words, every object is assigned a single level. 2 Weekly payroll processing is initiated by the lower level EMPLOYEE object with the sending of the a PAY message to the higher level PAY-INFO object. As the receiver is at a higher level than the sender, an innocuous NIL reply is returned by the message lter as mandated by the message ltering algorithm, which will be discussed in the next section. On receiving the PAY message, the method in PAY-INFO sends a read-down message b GET-HOURS, to the lower level WORK-INFO object in order to retrieve the hours worked. This information is retrieved 2 As explained in the next section, this does not pose any modeling limitations. and returned in the reply message c HOURS-WORKED. However the method invoked in the lower level object WORK-INFO on receipt of the GET-HOURS message, is prevented restricted by the message lter from updating the state of object WORK-INFO. This is required to prevent write-down violations. Finally, the accumulated hours for the week is reset to zero by the message e RESET-WEEKLY-HOURS.
Another scenario for write-up arises when the child-bene ts an employee is eligible for needs to be updated due to an increase in the numberofchildren. Such an update is most e ciently accomplished by a trigger red in the lower level EMPLOYEE object when the NO-CHILDREN attribute changes. The trigger would result in the sending of a message with the value of number of children, NO-CHILDREN, as a parameter to the higher level object PAY-INFO. The alternative to such a write-up would be that the PAY-INFO object scan the corresponding EMPLOYEE object for such c hanges, whenever the payroll is computed. However, this alternative imposes a signi cant performance cost for slowchanging information such as NO-CHILDREN.
The bene ts of write-up operations in object-oriented databases come at the cost and complexity of implementation mechanisms needed to support them. The complexity arises due to the intrinsic abstract nature of object-oriented computations. Conventional databases generally have a at view of data, and the operations are generally primitive reads and writes. Hence these operations may be assumed to take constant time. 3 Now contrast this with object-oriented systems where objects exhibit more complex structure and richer semantics. In this case, whenever a message is sent from a low level object to a higher one, we cannot assume that the invoked method in the receiver will terminate and return a reply in some constant time. Now, in the multilevel context, the actual reply from the higher level object cannot be returned to the lower level receiver as this will violate con dentiality. Hence we are faced with a fundamental dilemma. How and when do we resume a suspender sender method to mimic RPC semantics? Further, can this be done without violating condentiality? In other words, a suspended sender method should be resumed in such a w ay that the sender cannot make a n y inference about processing at higher levels.
Since the actual reply from a high level receiver cannot be returned, let us assume for a moment that an innocuous reply such as a NIL is substituted and returned as in the payroll example above. This assumption is made only for uniformity with the original message lter model 7 and for uniformity of coding. Thus we assume the receipt of the NIL reply as the logical point to resume a suspended sender method. If a reply NIL or otherwise is always guaranteed, the code for the sender method can be written to expect a reply whether the message is going up, down, at the same level or sideways in the lattice. Let us now examine how the timing of such a reply can have broad implications on con dentiality and integrity. To elaborate, consider the following alternate ways to deal with message replies:
Option 1: Return a NIL reply on completion of the method in the receiver object; Option 2: Return the reply independent of the termination of the receiver method: 3 In reality, e v en this is an approximation, albeit one that is normally made in the Bell-LaPadula style of models. Variations in read write times occur due to caching, bus contention, disk bu ers, demand paging, etc, and are usually manifested as timing covert channels.
Option 2a: Return the NIL reply after some constant time interval that represents an upper bound for completion times; Option 2b: Return the reply after some random delay; Option 2c: Return the NIL reply instantaneously.
With the rst option, we h a ve a sequential execution of methods governed by remote procedure call semantics. However, the timing of a reply can now be modulated by the method in the higher level receiver object, and this opens up the potential for a signaling channel. 4 Thus under this rst option, the integrity of the database is easy to maintain as we h a ve a simple sequential execution that requires no synchronization but secrecy is compromised. The second category of options attempts to eliminate the above signaling channel by making it impossible for delivery of the NIL reply to be modulated by a higher level method. Option 2a imposes a heavy performance penalty whenever the receiver method has terminated and the sender remains unnecessarily suspended, waiting for the constant time interval to elapse. If we adopt option 2b, by randomizing the delay before returning the reply, we are faced with a tradeo between performance and integrity. This is because if the reply is returned well after the termination of the receiver method, we are again unnecessarily holding up the sender method. On the other hand, if we return the reply too early before the receiver method has terminated we have to deal with the concurrent execution of methods. Concurrent executions introduce synchronization problems that can a ect the integrity of the database. In particular, it is essential that the concurrent executions guarantee equivalence to a sequential serial RPC-based execution, as in the rst option. When such equivalence can be guaranteed, we say that the concurrent computations preserve serial correctness. Note that this requirement of preserving serial correctness is entirely dictated by i n tegrity considerations. From a con dentiality viewpoint, there is no need to synchronize these concurrent executions.
To illustrate a scenario of how the integrity of the database can be compromised, consider again the payroll database in gure 1. A sequential execution will lead to the message sequence a, b, c, d, e, f; while a concurrent execution may produce the sequence a, d, e, f, b, c. When weekly payroll processing is initiated by the sending of the PAY message from the lower level EMPLOYEE U object to the higher level PAY-INFO S object, a NIL reply is returned to object EMPLOYEE and the suspended method in EMPLOYEE resumes execution. Now it is possible for the RESET-WEEKLY-HOURS message which resets the hours worked to zero to be received and processed by object WORK-INFO before the message GET-HOURS. Thus the message GET-HOURS will retrieve the reset hours as opposed to the actual accumulated hours, resulting in an erroneous calculation of the weekly pay. In other words, with this second option, secrecy can be assured by eliminating the above category of signaling channels. However this is done at the cost of integrity.
Finally, option 2c above calls for replies to be returned instantaneously. We thus no 4 In order to be precise, we distinguish between covert channels and signaling channels. A signaling channel is a means of downward information ow which is inherent in a data or computational model, and will therefore occur in every implementation of the model. A c o vert channel on the other hand is a property of a speci c implementation, and not a property of the data computational model. In other words, even if the data computational model is free of downward signaling channels, an implementation may w ell contain covert channels due to implementation speci c quirks.
longer incur the performance penalty that is possible with options 2a and 2b. However, we still have to address the integrity issue, as concurrent computations are now inevitable. We will demonstrate later in this paper how integrity can be achieved by the use of a multiversioning scheme that synchronizes concurrent actions on objects so as to guarantee serial correctness. To see how the multiversioning scheme applies to the payroll example, the e RESET-WEEKLY message would result in the creation of a new version of object WORK-INFO with the reset hours. However, an earlier version of object WORK-INFO that existed before the method in PAY-INFO w as invoked, is used to process the b GET-HOURS message. Serial correctness is now ensured as the GET-HOURS message now retrieves the intended weekly accumulated hours as in the sequential execution.
The objective of satisfying the requirements of con dentiality, integrity, and e ciency within a kernelized architectural framework i.e., without the use of trusted subjects restricts us considerably in choosing one of the above options to deal with message replies. To start with, we observe that the signaling channels that arise with option 1 are only possible in an architecture with trusted subjects. Thus at rst sight, it might appear that we could overcome this problem by utilizing a kernelized architecture. Unfortunately, option 1 is not implementable in a kernelized architecture as the ?-property prevents information ow from a higher level to a l o wer one, by disallowing write-downs. Such write-down operations are required to inform lower sender methods of the termination of higher level receivers. Option 2a and 2b are implementable in a kernelized architecture but at the cost of performance and integrity. Option 2c needs to address the integrity issue just as option 2b, but o ers better performance than the latter although as with option 2b, this comes at the cost of managing concurrency and multiversioning. Thus option 2c represents the best approach to handling write-up operations in a kernelized architecture. In summary we are forced to execute computations methods concurrently but nevertheless want to guarantee the original RPC-based semantics so as to preserve i n tegrity serial correctness.
The Message Filter Model
In this section we give some formal background to the message lter model. The model has evolved considerably since its original proposal. Our presentation in this section is limited to those aspects relevant to the understanding of this paper. For a more comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to 7, 21, 22, 24 .
The Message Filter Speci cation
Objects and messages constitute the main entities in the message lter model. As far as the security model is concerned, an entire object is classi ed at a single level. Modeling exibility is not lost due to this as a user may model multilevel entities. The multilevel entities form a conceptual schema that is broken down into an implementation schema of single-level objects 7 . Messages are assumed, and required to be, the only means by which objects communicate and exchange information. Thus the core idea is that information ow becontrolled by mediating the ow of messages. Consequently, even basic object activity such as access to internal attributes and object creation, are to be implemented by h a ving an object send messages to itself we consider such messages to be primitive messages. The message lter takes appropriate action upon intercepting a message and examining the classi cations of the sender and receiver of the message. It may let the message pass unaltered or interpose a NIL reply in place of the actual reply; or set the status of method invocations as restricted or unrestricted explained later. The message lter is the analog of the reference monitor in traditional access-mediation models.
The message lter algorithm is given in gure 2. In this and other algorithms, the symbolis used to delimit comments. Cases 1 through 4 deal with abstract messages, which are processed by methods. Cases 5 through 7 deal with primitive messages, which are directly processed by the security k ernel. In case 1, the sender and receiver are at the same security level, and the message g 1 and its reply are allowed to pass. In case 2 the levels are incomparable and thus the lter blocks the message from getting to the receiver object, and further injects a NIL reply. Case 3 involves a receiver at a higher level than the sender. The message is allowed to pass but the lter discards the actual reply, and substitutes a NIL instead. As we have argued, the timing of this NIL reply is a critical consideration. In case 4, the receiver object is at a lower level than the sender and the lter allows both the message and the reply to pass unaltered. In cases 1, 3, and 4 the method in the receiver object is invoked at a security level given by the variable rlevel. The intuitive signi cance of rlevel is that it keeps track of the least upper bound lub of all objects encountered in a chain of method invocations, going back to the root of the chain. The value of rlevel needs to becomputed for each receiver method invocation. In cases 1 and 4 the rlevel of the receiver method is the same as the rlevel of the sender method. In case 3, rlevel is the least upper bound of the rlevel of the sender method, and the classi cation of the receiver object.
The purpose of rlevel is to implement the notion of restricted method invocations so The cases 1 through 4 that we have seen so far deal with abstract messages. However abstract messages will eventually lead to the invocation of primitive messages. These include read, write and create cases 5 through 7. 5 Now read operations always succeed, while writes succeed only if the status of the method invoking the operation is unrestricted. Thus if a message is sent to a receiver object at a lower level as in case 4, the resulting method invocation will always berestricted and the corresponding primitive write operation will not succeed. This will ensure that a write-down violation will not 5 The delete operation has not been directly incorporated into the model. It can be viewed as a particularly drastic form of write and is subject to the same restrictions. Figure 4 illustrates our kernelized architecture. It is motivated and built upon the architecture of existing object-oriented database management systems. In particular, the demarcation into storage and object layers can be found in systems such as ORION, IRIS, and GEMSTONE 6, 11, 15 . The lower storage layer interfaces to the operating system and le system primitives, and is responsible for the management i.e., the read, write, and creation of typeless chunks of bytes representing objects. Every object is represented by a unique object-identi er. In our kernelized framework, the subset of this layer that is within the security perimeter consists of a single-level storage manager for every security level. A storage manager is responsible for the management of all objects at its level.
A Kernelized Architecture
In contrast to the storage layer, the object layer is not typeless, but rather supports the abstraction of objects as encapsulated and typed units of information. This layer is thus responsible for implementing the object-oriented data model. It is important t o note that much of the functionality required to implement the object-oriented data model lies outside of the scope of the TCB. Thus even support for the notion of objects as units of encapsulation, is provided by the object layer subset outside the TCB. Increasing the functionality of the object layer within the TCB, would increase its complexity, and would go against the design principles of security k ernels. The modules of the object layer that are within the security perimeter consists of level managers and message managers. A level manager is dynamically created for every level that can potentially have a method computation running 6 , although conceptually we assume that it exists permanently to simplify our exposition. Its primary function is to coordinate the various computations both queued and running at a single level, and it is thus relatively long-lived. A message manager process is created dynamically whenever a message is sent u p wards in the security lattice and concurrent execution of the sender and receiver methods is required. Once created, it implements the message ltering algorithm for the chain of methods emanating from such a concurrent receiver method. A message manager is thus a relatively short-lived process, and one that eventually terminates along with the last method in the associated chain.
The security perimeter of the object layer exports the following operations: send, quit, read, write, and create. The read, write, and create handle primitive messages. The system primitives send and quit are used by methods to send messages and replies. The interface between a message manager and a level manager consists of two calls: 1 fork issued by a message manager to request creation of a new message manager at a higher level, and 2 terminate issued by a message manager to its local level manager i.e., the 6 In our further discussions, we use the terms message managers, computations, and methods, interchangeably. A message manager is merely a concurrent computation executing a chain of methods. In reviewing the security perimeter of the above architecture, we wish to stress that the object layer plays no part in maintaining con dentiality. Now a primary objective in designing a kernelized architecture is to minimize the size of the security perimeter. Could we not then realize a secure database system without having the storage and object layers in the TCB security perimeter? If con dentiality w ere our only objective, the answer to the latter question would be yes". The operating system alone would su ce to enforce the basic mandatory controls required to guarantee con dentiality. However, in a database system integrity is vital. This is why in our architecture, we h a ve c hosen to show the object and storage layers to be within the TCB. These modules are thus trusted", but only in the sense being correct, and not in the sense of being exempt from mandatory controls. Even if correctness fails, these modules cannot compromise con dentiality b y leaking information. In other words, the correctness of these modules can a ect integrity but not con dentiality. 7 The message ltering algorithm presented earlier can be thought of as an abstract nonexecutable speci cation of the ltering functions. An executable speci cation, as implemented by a message manager, is given in gure 5. As mentioned before, the send call is invoked by methods to send messages, while the quit is used to return replies. A stack is used to save the contexts associated with nested message sends. Whenever a message is sent by a method t 1 in an object o 1 to a second object o 2 at the same or lower level cases 1 and 4, the message manager saves the message parameters on a new stack frame, suspends execution of t 1 , and begins execution of the method t 2 in object o 2 . When t 2 terminates, the stack is popped and the return value from t 2 is recorded on the stack. The suspended sender method t 1 is then resumed, and it retrieves the return value from t 2 from the top frame of the stack. However, when messages are sent to incomparable or higher levels cases 2 and 3, a NIL value is recorded on the stack and t 1 is resumed immediately. In case 3 when a message is sent u p wards in the security lattice, a message manager issues a fork call resulting in concurrent computations as t 1 is resumed independently of the termination of t 2 . The parameters of this call include the level of forking message manager, the level of the forked message manager, a unique fork stamp identifying the start order in the equivalent sequential execution for the forked message manager, and a vector rstamps of timestamps to process read down requests. Whenever a reply is returned and a message manager nds its stack to be empty, it means that there are no suspended methods waiting to be resumed.
The message manager then issues a terminate call to its local level manager, to terminate itself. The parameters of the terminate call include the level and fork stamp of the terminated message manager, as well as a timestamp identifying the last written version. A message manager utilizes the following data structures in the algorithm. 7 We believe it is misleading to assume that once a module is within the TCB, it will a ect security. This is because security itself consists of three distinct, but inter-related areas: con dentiality, i n tegrity, and availability. A module may be placed in the TCB for one or more of these reasons.
local-stamp: a v ector of timestamps to process read down requests, with one entry for each level dominated by the level of the message manager; rstamps:
This is an incrementally constructed vector that is used to initialize the local-stamp structure. fork-stamp: a stamp identifying the message manager's fork order; wstamp:
the write stamp for versions written by the message manager;
The local-stamp structure is needed to ensure serial correctness as it identi es the proper versions to read at all levels dominated by the message manager. This structure is initialized partially with the values of a vector rstamps, that is passed down by the ancestors of a message manager. When a message manager forks a new child computation, it appends the rstamps vector with a variable wstamp, and in turn passes it on to the new child this is accomplished with a call to a prede ned routine append-rstamps-vector, a s s h o wn in gure 5. The wstamp is a scalar variable which identi es the next version of objects that will be written created at the level of the message manager. The wstamp is incremented by the message manager every time a fork request is issued. On the termination of the message manager, its wstamp is saved in the local level manager's current-wstamp variable. When a new message manager subsequently starts at this level, it will initialize its wstamp entry by reading o this current-wstamp value and incrementing it by one as shown in algorithm start in gure 13. This increment is needed to avoid the latest created versions from being initially overwritten.
In moving from an abstract to an executable speci cation, we h a ve so far described how the lter allows and blocks messages, and how return values are set to NIL. Now it remains to show h o w the notions of rlevel and restricted method invocations are implemented. The basic idea is very straightforward. Every message manager process is assigned a security level that is equivalent to the rlevel assigned in the ltering algorithm, and all methods executed by a message manager run at this level. The e ect of restricted method invocations is now achieved by the enforcement of the standard ? property in the Bell-LaPadula type security models 2 . In other words, whenever a method's status is restricted, its level and the level of its message manager will be higher than the object accessed, and the ? property will prevent a n y write-down attempts.
As all our modules are single-level, our architecture needs to handle polyinstantiation of object identi ers. What if a subject requests the creation of a low-level object with an object-id that has already been assigned to a previously created higher level object? If the request is honored, we h a ve a n i n tegrity problem as the object identi ers are no longer unique. If the request is rejected a signaling channel may be opened up. A solution would beto consider the user given identi ers as logical ones mapped to unique physical object identi ers that are system derived. The address space for the physical object identi ers could now be partitioned across the security levels. This will ensure that objects at di erent levels are not assigned the same physical id. An alternative to partitioning the physical address space would beto rely on a system component that generates identi ers in some cryptographically-strong pseudo-random fashion. This ensures that object identi ers cannot be used as a signaling channel. In this section we focus on issues related to concurrency and scheduling within a single user session. We begin by discussing the notion of serial correctness and how this governs the degree of concurrency that can be allowed within a session. Maintenance of serial correctness requires that we capture the serial order of computations. This is done by means of a hierarchical scheme to generate forkstamps. Two extreme scheduling strategies both of which preserve serial correctness, but o er varying degrees of concurrency, are then discussed. Finally we present a framework for the analysis of these and other scheduling schemes.
Serial correctness versus concurrency
In section 2 we discussed the synchronization problem caused by concurrent computations and how this can a ect serial correctness. To elaborate in more general terms, we can visualize a set of concurrent computations as a computation tree such as that shown in gure 6. In this gure we see that message manager 1 at the unclassi ed level has sent messages to one secret object, one top-secret object, and one con dential object in this sequence we consider message manager 1 to be the ancestor parent of the three. As these objects are higher in level than unclassi ed, message ltering has resulted in the creation and concurrent execution of message managers 2, 3 , a n d 4 a s c hildren of the root message manager 1. We can now formally de ne serial correctness in terms of such a tree. 8 8 It is important to realize that even though the notions of serial correctness and serializability m a y appear to be analogous, they are not equivalent. Serializability theory in classical transaction management and concurrency control realms reasons about correctness and integrity in terms of the fundamental abstraction of a transaction". Serial correctness on the other hand, is a more primitive notion as it does not recognize De nition 1 We say a session preserves serial correctness if for any computation c in the session's computation tree, and running at level l, the following hold:
1. c does not see any updates by reading-down of lower level computations that are to its right in the tree; 2. For any of c's ancestor computations a, i.e., any computation on the path from the root to c c should see only the latest updates made by a just before a's child or c itself on this path was forked. 3. For any level k that is not the level of an ancestor of c, and k l, c should see the latest updates made by the rightmost terminated computations at level k that are still to the left of c.
Given the above de nition, let us see the complications concurrency poses to the maintenance of serial correctness. Now if we were to execute the above tree sequentially, the messages sent to higher level objects would beprocessed in the order given by the labels on the arrows. Note that this order can bederived by a depth-rst traversal of the tree. However, with concurrent execution it is possible that message managers 4C and 6S may terminate well ahead of 3TS. Therefore our synchronization schemes must ensure that message manager 3 does not see any updates by message managers 4 and 6, since 4 and 6 are to the right o f 3 .
Solving the above synchronization problem using classical techniques, such as those based on locking and semaphores, is known to be insecure as they open up signaling channels. Also, it is not possible to implement them in a kernelized architecture without introducing trusted subjects since we need the ability to write-down and read-up. Our solution instead relies on a multiversioning scheme. The scheme calls for multiple versions of objects created and accessed by a session to bekept in memory. Such versions are invisible to other user sessions. Of course, if object versions are in virtual memory, they may migrate to the disk, but will still be unavailable to other sessions. 9 Each v ersion is uniquely identi ed with a timestamp, and can be thought of as a checkpoint in the overall progress of a tree of computations. Thus although 4C and 6S may terminate well ahead of 3TS, we are guaranteed that a read-down request from 3TS will always read versions that existed before 4C and 6S were started.
Given a computation, say c, the multiversioning scheme suggested above can provide synchronization when other computations to c's right in the tree get ahead. But to guarantee serial correctness, we m ust in addition ensure that c itself does not get ahead of earlier forked computations to its left. For example, under a sequential execution of the tree of the abstraction or semantics of transactions, and is further more restrictive as it allows only a single serial order ie., the order of an RPC-based serial execution of computations methods. However, if we were to map individual computations to transactions and derive the transaction serialization order from the forkstamps, serial correctness amounts to a stricter form of the multiversion concurrency control notion of one-copy serializability 3 . We i n tentionally do not give such a de nition as this would give the impression that we are dealing with transactions, and would further introduce unnecessary formal machinery in our exposition.
computations in gure 6, we would expect message manager 2S and its descendants if any to terminate before message manager 3TS to its right, is started. Message manager 3TS should thus see all the latest updates by 2S and any of its descendants. Allowing arbitrary concurrency may not ensure this. Thus, in addition to multiversion synchronization, we need to enforce some discipline on these concurrent computations by scheduling them in a manner that guarantees serial correctness.
A scheduling strategy which guarantees serial correctness must take into account the following considerations.
The scheduling strategy itself must be secure in that it should not introduce any signaling channels. The amount of unnecessary delay a computation experiences before it is started should be reduced.
The rst condition above requires that a low-level computation never bedelayed waiting for the termination of another one at a higher or incomparable level. If this were allowed, a potential for a signaling channel is again opened up. Fortunately, such c hannels cannot be introduced in a kernelized architecture and the con dentiality of the scheduling strategy thus comes for free. The second consideration admits a family of scheduling strategies o ering varying degrees of performance. Some of these are discussed later in the next section.
In summary, the maintenance of serial correctness requires careful consideration on how computations are scheduled as well as on how versions are assigned to process read down requests. Collectively we h a ve to guarantee the following constraints as discussed in section 5.2, we assume that every computation is assigned a strictly increasing forkstamp that is consistent with the start order in a sequential execution:
Whenever a computation c is started at a level l, Correctness-constraint 1: There cannot exist any earlier forked computation i.e. with a smaller forkstamp at level l, that is pending execution; Correctness-constraint 2 : All current non-ancestral as well as future executions of computations that have forkstamps smaller than that of c, w ould have t o b e a t l e v els l or higher; Correctness-constraint 3: At each level below l, the object versions read by c would have to bethe latest ones created by computations such as k, that have the largest forkstamp that is still less than the forkstamp of c. If k is an ancestor of c, then the latest version given to c is the one that was created by k just before c was forked.
We state formally as a theorem the su ciency of these constraints. 
The multiversioning scheme requires a new object version to be created with every fork request issued message sent u p wards in the security lattice. In the worst case, what is the maximum numberof versions at a level l that need to beconcurrently retained by a user session, at any given time? This is equal to the number of subtrees rooted at the immediate children of any computation at level l, with one or more non-terminated computations.
From an integrity standpoint, prematurely purging older versions may cause high level methods to fail, on issuing read requests.
Maintaining global serial order
We now discuss an implementation consideration for our scheduling schemes which has to do with maintaining knowledge of the equivalent global serial order in which computations are forked within a user session. In scheduling various computations, such knowledge is used to determine when a computation will be started. In an architectural framework without multilevel trusted subjects, no single system component has a global view such as the tree in gure 6 of the entire set of computations as they progress. In coordinating various computations, an individual level manager has to determine where in the global serial fork order, the computations at its level belong. One could betempted to pursue a solution requiring the value of a global real-time clock t o be appended to every message manager computation as it is forked. However, computations are not always forked in the equivalent serial order and thus a solution based on a real-time clock will not always work.
In 24 we proposed a hierarchical scheme to generate fork-stamps that is independent of the scheduling strategy used. The fork-stamps so generated, re ect the equivalent serial order of execution of the computations. Figure 7 shows a tree of computations and the fork-stamps generated for it. Every message manager except the root is assigned a unique fork-stamp by the parent issuing the fork. The scheme starts by assigning an initial forkstamp of 0000 to the root message manager 1U. Every subsequent c hild of the root is then given a fork-stamp derived from this initial one by progressively incrementing the most signi cant leftmost digit by one. To generalize this scheme for the entire tree, we require that with increasing levels, a less signi cant digit be incremented. In general for a security lattice with a longest maximal chain of n elements, we need to reserve p n , 1 digits for the forkstamp. In a lattice with l levels, and c compartments, n = l + c. The value of p would depend on the maximum degree of a node in a computation tree. For example if we assume that any computation sends a maximum of 99 messages to higher levels, then setting p = 2 w ould be su cient.
A conservative level-by-level scheduling scheme
We now discuss a level-by-level scheduling scheme 24 . We characterize this approach as being conservative as opposed to being aggressive since the objective here is not to maximize concurrency. In other words, a computation may be unnecessarily delayed before being started even if its earlier execution would not violate serial correctness. Although this scheme may not always be optimal in terms of performance, it does give insights into how concurrent computations can bescheduled and completed in a simple, yet secure, correct, and distributed fashion. If in an application, the individual computations are of very short durations, the conservative scheme might b e a good or even the preferred choice since it requires fewer data structures, is easier to implement, and the unnecessary delay induced, Thus the basic idea is to execute forked computations in a bottom up fashion in the lattice, starting with the lowest level. At any point, only computations at incomparable levels can be concurrently executing. We t h us begin with the root computation and allow i t to run to completion. Meanwhile, all higher level computations that are forked by the root are unconditionally queued in forkstamp order at these higher levels, by the respective level managers. Upon termination of the root, its level manager signals that it is okay to release computations at all immediate higher levels by sending a WAKE-UP message to these levels. Thus when a level manager receive s a W AKE-UP message from all immediate lower levels, it proceeds to dequeue and execute computations at its level one at a time. Note that, at this point, this level manager is guaranteed that no more fork requests will beforthcoming from lower levels. Eventually, the level manager will nd its queue to be empty. The next higher levels are then released through WAKE-UP messages.
For a more visual explanation of this level-by-level scheduling strategy, consider the lattice in gure 8. On termination of the root computation at level U,fg , WAKE-UP messages are sent to all the immediate higher levels C,fAg , C,fBg , C,fDg , and queued computations at these levels are then released. Next, computations at S,fB,Dg are started when all those at the immediate lower levels C,fBg and C,fDg have terminated. Eventually, computations at the highest level TS,fA,B,Dg are started on the termination of computations at levels S,fAg and S,fB,Dg followed by the receipt of a WAKE-UP message from each of these levels.
Figures 9a through 9g illustrate the progressive execution of the computation tree in gure 6, as governed by the level-by-level scheduling scheme. At each stage the termination of a computation results in the start-up of another. In this example, there can only be one computation executing at any given moment as the lattice is totally ordered. More generally, w e could have m ultiple computations running, provided they are at incomparable levels. As shown in gure 9a, the startup of the root computation has resulted in its forked children to be queued the unborn computations have not yet been created, and are shown in the gures for visual completeness only. The subsequent termination of the root see gure 9 b has resulted in the forked child, at the lowest level 4C, to be executed.
The level manager algorithms to implement this scheduling strategy are given in gures 10 through 13. The level manager data structures utilized in these algorithms are described below:
Level manager data structures:
current-wstamp: the current timestamp given to objects written; queue:
a queue of message managers waiting to be activated;
terminate-history: a list of ordered pairs fork-stamp, wstamp;
When a computation is forked, it is unconditionally queued by the local level manager, as shown in procedure fork in gure 10. When noti ed of the termination of a message manager at its level, a local manager dequeues and starts the next computation at the head of its local queue; if the queue is found to beempty, a WAKE-UP message is sent to all immediate higher levels see procedure terminate in gure 11. When a level manager receives a WAKE-UP message from each of the immediate lower levels, it dequeues its local queue and starts the next computation; if the queue is empty, the WAKE-UP message is simply forwarded to all the immediate higher levels in the lattice.
A message manager's local-stamp vector is initialized in two phases, with the rst one undertaken when a message manager is forked and the second one deferred until the message manager actually starts. For a message manager just forked, the rst phase entries identify the versions to be read at the levels of ancestors, on the path from the root to itself i.e., the path in a computation tree for a session. These rst phase entries are actually obtained by a message manager from another vector that is passed along by its parent. Such a vector can be seen as one that is incrementally constructed along a path in the computation tree. To do this, every message manager is required to save the timestamps in the vector rstamps obtained from its parent and on issuing a fork, to reconstruct a new vector to give to its child see gure 5. This newly constructed vector will contain the timestamps from the old vector appended with the write stamp wstamp at the level of the issuing message manager. Finally, in the second phase we obtain local-stamp entries for the levels that did not participate in phase one this is done in the start procedure of gure 13. Begin execution of the message manager nn executenn; g end procedure start; Figure 13 : Level manager algorithm for start processing with the largest forkstamp that is still less than the forkstamp of the message manager to be started, is selected, and the associated version timestamp is read into the corresponding local-stamp entry.
We conclude this subsection by giving proofs of correctness and termination for our conservative level-by-level scheduling algorithms.
Proof of correctness.
Theorem 2 The conservative level-by-level scheduling algorithms maintain the invariant inv-conservative.
Proof:
While there are two message manager algorithms, namely send and quit and four level manager algorithms fork, start, terminate and wake-up, we focus only the latter two for the proof. The terminate and the wake-up algorithms invoke the start procedure whereby computations get activated started. It su ces therefore to show that these algorithms procedures maintain the invariant inv-conservative.
Consider the terminate procedure rst. If we assume that the invariant holds as a pre-condition before the procedure was invoked, then it follows that there are no active o r queued computations at level lmsgmgr or lower. Now if the startmm statement is reached, the following pre-conditions are true: a there exists one or more queued computations at level lmsgmgr; b the computation mm, with the lowest forkstamp will bestarted. The startmm statement further ensures the post-condition: c mm, being the computation with the smallest forkstamp is started, and there are no queued or active computations at lower levels. This implies maintains the invariant. On the other hand, if the startmm statement is not reached the invariant o b viously continues to be true.
Consider the wake-up procedure next. From the terminate procedure we see that a WAKE-UP message is sent to all immediate higher levels only if there are no active or queued computations at or below the level that sent the message. Hence, when a WAKE-UP message has been received at a level say lwake, from all lower levels, the following are true: d. there are no queued or active computations at levels lower than lwake; e. there are no active or terminated computations at level lwake. The latter condition is true since a computation can be started only as a result of a previous terminate at the same level or due to the receipt of a WAKE-UP message and no terminate event would have occurred at lwake at this point. Thus when the statement startmm is executed, the following post-condition is true: f mm is the rst computation to be activated at level lwake and there exists no queued or active computations at levels lwake or lower. This clearly maintains the desired invariant. Once again, if the startmm is not reached, the invariant continues to hold.2
Having shown how our algorithms maintain the invariant inv-conservative, w e n o w argue how these algorithms preserve serial correctness by maintaining correctness constraints 1, 2, and 3. We state this below as a corollary. identifying the states of objects written at the level of these ancestors before each successive child in the ancestral path was forked. The second phase entries on the other hand identify latest versions written at lower levels for which there were no ancestors. In summary, all read down operations that are mapped to the versions identi ed by the local-stamp entries, will read the same object states as in a sequential execution, and thus maintain correctness constraint 3 . 2
Proof of termination
In order to proceed with a proof of termination, we assume that once a method computation is started, it runs uninterrupted to completion. Obviously, such an assumption can be valid only if the bodyof the method contains no errors such as an in nite loop. We assume that there is some time-out mechanism in place, to handle such situations. We argue termination of individual computations methods by formally stating and proving the lemma below: Lemma 1 Once a computation is started, it is guaranteed to terminate.
Proof: The proof follows from two observations:
1. Whenever a computation issues a send which results in a FORK, it is not blocked, but rather runs concurrently with the receiver computation. Thus, if a computation only issued forked new computations, it is guaranteed to run to completion and terminate since only a nite numberofFORK requests can be issued.
2. Whenever a method issues a send that does not result in a FORK, it will be blocked and in general this could result in a chain of blocked methods. However, there will always bea method executing and progressing to termination at the end of such a chain, and if are no cyclical send relationships, such a method will eventually resume its blocked predecessor. It follows that any blocked method will be resumed eventually and allowed to run to completion in nite steps.
We formally state as a theorem, that a session will eventually terminate.
Theorem 3 Under the conservative scheduling scheme, all computations in a session will eventually terminate and thus guarantee the termination of a user session.
Proof:
By induction on the numberof security levels, n, at which computations are forked in a session.
Basis: Consider the basis with n = 0 . Then the only level with active computations will not have a n y fork requests emanating from it. It follows from the second part of the proof of lemma 1 that the session is guaranteed to terminate.
Inductive
Step: For the induction hypothesis assume that when n is equal to m, all computations terminate at the m levels and a WAKE-UP is sent to all immediate higher levels. For the inductive step consider m + 1 levels where level l m+1 is a maximal element in the security lattice and dominates a subset of the m levels. Now by the induction hypothesis, all computations at the m levels would have terminated and hence a WAKE-UP message would have been received at level l m+1 from all immediate lower levels in m. It now remains for us to show that a WAKE-UP is received at level l m+1 from all immediate lower levels dominated by l m+1 that never had active computations in the user session. These levels thus do not belong to m. The argument t o s h o w this can be made from the following: 1
The induction hypothesis guarantees that the root computations which are at the lowest level, say l 1 , i n m, w ould have terminated and sent a W AKE-UP message to all immediate higher levels; 2 WAKE-UP messages are always forwarded across empty levels. Hence all levels which dominate l 1 and in turn are dominated by l m+1 would have WAKE-UP messages forwarded through them. This guarantees that l m+1 would receive these messages from all immediate lower levels, and when this happens the computation at the head of the queue which has the smallest forkstamp will be dequeued and started. The termination of this rst computation at level l m+1 leads to the startup of the next one in the queue.
Every terminate results in the next computation in the queue to be subsequently started in turn. The queue will thus be progressively emptied in nite steps and all computations at level l m+1 would have then terminated. Thus the entire session will terminate. 2 
An aggressive scheduling scheme
We n o w describe an aggressive s c heduling algorithm. It is governed by the following invariant:
Inv-aggressive: A computation is executing at a level l only if all non-ancestor computations in the corresponding session with smaller fork stamps at levels l or lower, have terminated. We characterize this as an aggressive" scheme as every attempt is made to execute a forked computation immediately. The above invariant implies that if a computation is denied immediate execution, then there must be at least one non-ancestral lower level computation with an earlier forkstamp, that has not terminated. The invariant ensures that the correctness constraints 1 and 2 are never violated. The correctness of read-down operations is again dependent o n m ulti-versioning.
The implementation algorithms for the aggressive scheduling scheme are given in gures 14, 15, and 16 the start algorithm is the same as in gure 13 End-If End-For g end procedure terminate-aggressive; Figure 16 : Processing terminate requests under aggressive s c heduling scheme. In addition to the data structures needed to implement the conservative s c heme, the aggressive one requires that every level manager maintain a fork-history consisting of a list of ordered pairs fork-stamp, level. This helps a level manager keep track of the fork requests generated at its level.
The major di erences between the aggressive and conservative schemes as evident in these algorithms, can be summarized as follows:
On being forked, a computation may beimmediately started, if doing so would not violate the invariant inv-aggressive see gure 14.
The termination of a computation may result in the start-up of the next queued computation at the same level as well as multiple computations at other higher levels as shown in gure 16. A w ake-up is sent to a higher level only if there exists at least one queued computation pending execution at the higher level see the second half of the algorithm in gure 16. The fork-histories at lower levels are examined to determine this. A level may receive m ultiple wake-up messages before all its queued computations are released. We n o w elaborate on these algorithms. When a computation is forked see the if statement in gure 14, we h a ve to decide if it can be started immediately. A forked computation is started immediately if there exists no non-terminated computations at lower levels and with smaller forkstamps. We can determine all the computations forked at lower levels by examining the fork histories at these levels. We can further determine which of these computations have terminated by examining the terminate histories at these lower levels. When processing terminate requests, a similar check is made upon the termination of a computation at a level to see if the next computation if any at the head of the queue for this level, can be started see gure 16. We also check to see if computations queued at higher levels can be released. We examine the fork histories at lower levels for computations that have been forked from these lower levels but have larger forkstamps than the just terminated computation see the for statement in gure 16. Such computations with larger forkstamps can be started so long as they are not preceded by l o wer level non-terminated computations to the left in the computation tree. A WAKE-UP message is sent to the level managers at the levels for which computations can bestared. On receiving such a message, a level manager dequeues and starts the next computation at the head of its queue see gure 15 . Figure 17 illustrates how a tree of computations can advance to termination under the aggressive s c heme. In particular, we note that the termination of a computation may result in multiple start-ups of others at higher levels even with a totally ordered security lattice, so long as the invariant is not violated see gure 17 b where computations 3 and 6 are started on termination of 2. We also observe that with aggressive s c heduling, by the time the rst three terminations have occurred, namely, 2S, 3TS, and 5TS, the entire tree of computations has been released for execution see gure 17d. Now compare the progress of this tree under conservative scheduling where the rst three terminations as shown in gure 9 d, still leaves three others queued and awaiting execution. In summary, the tree progresses to termination at a much faster rate, under the aggressive s c heduling scheme.
We n o w give proofs of correctness and termination for the aggressive s c heme.
Proof of correctness.
Theorem 4 The aggressive scheduling algorithms maintain the invariant inv-aggressive.
Proof:
We start with the fork-aggressive procedure in gure 14. We see that for the statement startmm to be executed, the following pre-conditions are true:
a. there exists no non-ancestral queued or active computations at or below levelmm and with a smaller forkstamp than mm; b. mm is the only computation at levelmm.
After computation mm has been started the condition a above still holds and thus the invariant is maintained. A similar argument can bemade for the startmm statement in procedure terminate-aggressive. When mm is dequeued, condition a above holds, and since mm has the smallest forkstamp in the queue, the invariant is maintained after the execution of startmm.
It now remains to show that the start-up of a computation due to the receipt of a WAKE-UP message at a level, will not violate the invariant. To see this, we observe that a WAKE-UP message is sent to a higher level in the terminate-aggressive procedure only if there exists a pending computation say, c at the higher level that was denied immediate execution at fork time. Further, c has to have the smallest forkstamp among others at its level and should not be preceded by active or queued pending computations at lower levels and with a smaller fork than itself. Thus on receiving a WAKE-UP message, a level meets all the necessary conditions to start a computation. The post-condition following the startmm statement in procedure wake-up-aggressive thus maintains the invariant. 2 We now state and show h o w the invariant inv-aggressive maintains serial correctness under our implementation.
Corollary 2 The aggressive scheduling implementation maintains serial correctness.
Proof:
We basically have to show h o w the correctness constraints 1, 2, and 3 are maintained. For a computation to be dequeued and successfully started, invariant inv-aggressive requires all earlier forked computations at level l or lower, to have terminated. But this is what is precisely required to maintain correctness constraints 1 and 2. The argument for the maintenance correctness constraint 3 is independent of the scheduling algorithm used. Thus the earlier argument given for the conservative case still holds.2
Proof of termination
Theorem 5 Under the aggressive scheduling scheme, all computations in a session will eventually terminate and thus guarantee the termination of a user session. To argue proof of termination for the aggressive algorithm, we observe that if a computation is denied immediate execution this can only beat fork time. Again we assume that once started, a computation is guaranteed to terminate by lemma 1. Our task is thus basically to show that every queued pending computation will eventually be started. Now if on fork, a computation f is denied immediate execution, then there must be at least one active computation say c, with a smaller stamp than f and at or below levelf. Now the termination of c is guaranteed by lemma 1. The termination of c will cause at least one computation with a greater forkstamp than c and a smaller forkstamp than f, or f itself, to bestarted. Now if f is not started, there can only be a nite numberofcomputations that can potentially block f. Subsequent terminate events will progressively decrease the number of such computations with a smaller forkstamp than f. This will result in the eventual release of f for execution. With a similar argument, we can show that every queued computation will eventually be released for execution and thus run to termination.
Thus the entire session will eventually terminate, concluding the proof. 2 
Analysis and Discussion
The conservative and aggressive s c hemes discussed above can be seen as two that approach the ends of a spectrum of secure and correct scheduling strategies. This is because it is meaningless to come up with any algorithm that does worse than the conservative one, in terms of the degree of concurrency allowed. At any given time, if there is a computation active at a maximal level in the lattice, then no other computations may beconcurrently active. The conservative s c heme thus exhibits the least meaningful degree of concurrency within a session. The only way t o d o w orse would be to allow computations at incomparable levels in the lattice to execute one at a time. On the other hand with the aggressive scheme, we can potentially have concurrent computations running at every level. This can happen if a computation is forked at the highest level in the lattice, and this is followed by consecutive fork requests where each request is at the next lower level and the lifetimes of these computations are long enough to overlap. One can always increase the degree of concurrency by exploiting intra-level concurrency. But con icts at the same level can beeasily handled by well-known concurrency control techniques. We do not explore this issue further in this paper as it lies outside the scope of the execution model and scheduling protocols we present. In this subsection we brie y outline a framework for the comparative analysis of various scheduling schemes. In particular, we develop the notion of delay-degree as a metric for analyzing scheduling strategies. We demonstrate how b y v arying this metric, we can derive and admit a family of scheduling strategies o ering varying degrees of concurrency, while guaranteeing con dentiality and serial correctness.
We begin with some de nitions.
De nition 2 A level is inactive if no computation is executing at the level. De nition 4 We say a level l is serial-execution enabled or s-enabled for short, if there exists at least one forked computation c, a t l, and there are no active or queued non-parent computations with smaller fork stamps than c, at level l or below.
Intuitively, when a level is s-enabled, executing the next computation at the head of the queue at this level will not violate serial correctness. A computation that is denied execution by a scheduling scheme when its level becomes s-enabled is therefore experiencing an unnecessary delay. We build on this observation and extend it below t o an entire security lattice in order to formulate a metric for analysis purpose.
De nition 5 A scheduling algorithm introduces an unnecessary delay whenever any level is s-enabled but remains inactive.
De nition 6 We say a chain of n security levels in a lattice is fully-enabled whenever every level in the chain is concurrently s-enabled.
De nition 7 We de ne a computation tree t o b e a full-enabler for a given security lattice, if it causes a longest maximal chain in the lattice to be fully-enabled.
Thus when a maximal chain in the lattice is fully-enabled, computations can beconcurrently running at every level in the chain. However, when scheduling is governed by some scheme, it is only certain scenarios that can lead to such chains being fully-enabled. We characterize below the computation trees associated with such scenarios as realizers.
De nition 8 For a given scheduling algorithm and security lattice, we de ne a realizable full-enabler or realizer for short to be a full-enabler, which when scheduled by the algorithm, causes a longest maximal chain in the lattice to be fully-enabled.
De nition 9 We say a realizer has a delay-degree d-degree of k for some scheduling algorithm, if it causes k computations to experience unnecessary delays.
De nition 10 Given a security lattice SC, a scheduling algorithm A is considered to have a delay-degree d-degree of k, where k = max fd-degree o f a l l r ealizers for SC under Ag.
Given a set of secure scheduling algorithms schemes, we can now use their d-degrees as a basis for comparison. We t h us need to derive the d-degree for any given scheduling scheme.
To do this, we consider all the realizable full-enablers realizers and observe the maximum number of computations excepting the root that are denied immediate execution, on being forked. This numberwould give us the d-degree.
As an illustration, consider the full-enabler trees in gure 18 for a lattice with a longest maximal chain of three levels U, C, and S where U C S. For the aggressive s c heme, we see that both trees are realizers and in either cases no computation would be unnecessarily delayed. For the conservative scheme, only the tree in 18a is a realizer and we see that computations 2S and 3C would be unnecessarily delayed. For a further illustration, consider all the full-enabler trees for four levels U, C, S, and TS, as shown in gures 19a through 19e. All the trees are realizers for the aggressive scheme, and in each case no computation would beunnecessarily delayed. However, only the tree in gure 19a is a realizer for the conservative s c heme and the computations 2TS, 3S, and 4C would be unnecessarily delayed.
In So far we h a ve l o o k ed at the issues of concurrency and scheduling within a single user session. We n o w focus on how objects can be shared across multiple concurrent user sessions. In the database literature, schemes to achieve this generally fall under the category of concurrency control and transaction management. Our purpose here is not to discuss a comprehensive concurrency control scheme, but only to give a basic usable secure solution to object sharing across user sessions. Discussion of a comprehensive transaction model for multilevel systems is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our approach to object sharing is based on a checkin checkout access data model 13 . There exists a public single-version database from which user sessions checkout objects as needed. The objects are checked out into local workspaces private databases of individual user sessions. When all activity associated with an object has ceased, the object is checked back into the public database. Due to concurrent activity in a user session, computations within a user session may view several versions of the same object. However, visibility across user sessions is limited to the public database which maintains only the latest version of every object.
Modeling user sessions as hierarchical transactions
In order to reason about the e ects of concurrent user sessions on objects, we cast our solutions in terms of the familiar concept of transactions. For this, we present a model of a user session as a hierarchical set tree of multilevel subtransactions. We model the actions of each computation as a set of subtransactions. To bemore precise, all the actions from the start-up to the issuing of the rst fork request is considered to be one subtransaction. The subtransaction is considered to berunning at the level of the corresponding computation. All actions between each subsequent pair of fork requests are considered to belong to individual subtransactions. Finally, all actions between the last fork request and the termination of the computation are modeled as one subtransaction. A subtransaction is considered to be the smallest unit of execution and is thus atomic. Thus if a subtransaction fails, it leaves the database objects unchanged, and as far as the database is concerned the subtransaction was never created. The atomicity property also means that operations from individual subtransactions cannot interfere with each other. In other words, subtransactions execute serially. Also, it follows from our hierarchical formulation above, that a subtransaction writes only at its level.
In gure 20, the computation 1U forks two computations 2C and 4C and is thus modeled as a set of subtransactions 1U 1 , 1 U 2 , 1 U 3 . All transactions generated by a single computation are numbered by a transaction stamp derived by concatenating the forkstamp of the computation with the next consecutive i n teger. This guarantees the uniqueness of the transaction stamps thus assigned. Modeling all the nodes in a tree results in a hierarchical tree-like structure of subtransactions. In gure 20, we see that there is a subtree rooted at 2C 1 . This means that a fork of computation 3S was issued by transaction 2C 1 . The subtree consists of all the transactions generated by the forked computation 3S.
Multilevel checkin checkout of objects
One of the considerations in designing an object sharing and transaction management scheme is that of formulating and maintaining some notion of inter-session correctness. Conventional database management s c hemes primarily support transactions that are shortlived and competitive. Interactions and visibility across such transactions are curtailed and
4(C) Figure 20 : A computation tree and its hierarchical transaction mapping the correctness of concurrent transactions is governed by serializability. However, if we examine the applications that are impelling the development of object-oriented database technology, we nd that they are characterized by requirements that di er from those utilizing conventional databases. These applications are generally found in environments that call for cooperative work such as computer-aided design. In such e n vironments, serializability a s a correctness criterion needs to berelaxed, and interactions between concurrent transactions have to be promoted rather than curtailed. In light of this, in our further discussions we do not assume that serializability is enforced. We now discuss how a checkin checkout scheme can becoupled with our hierarchical transaction model so as to facilitate object sharing across concurrent user sessions. Our choice of a checkin checkout scheme as opposed to other conventional schemes directly follows from the above assumption that transactions are cooperative in nature. We provide the following commands to implement a c heckin checkout scheme:
1. Public-checkoutR W: Checks out an object from the public database. 2. Public-checkin: Checks in an object into the public database. 3. Local-checkoutR W: Checks out an object from the local workspace of a user session.
4. Local-checkin: Checks in an object into a session's local workspace.
The local commands di er from the public ones as their e ects are internal to a session, and thus do not a ect the visibility o r a vailability of objects to other concurrent user sessions. A checkout operation can be requested in read R or write W mode. A checkout in W mode is permitted only if the computation generating the requesting subtransaction and the object to be checked out are at the same level. On the other hand, whenever a computation or more precisely a subtransaction requests a checkout of a lower level object, the request is granted in read R mode only. Multiple subtransactions may c heckout the same object or version of an object in R mode. However, if a subtransaction checks out a version in W mode, then no subtransaction may check out the version in either R or W mode as checkouts in R mode con ict with those in W mode. The W mode checkout operation is thus exclusive with respect to an object. While the checkin operation is necessary for any object checked out in W mode, it is redundant and can be ignored for any object checked out in R mode.
If a requested object has not been checked out by a user session so far, a public checkout request is issued. If however the object had been previously checked out from the public database by the session, it is simply checked out from the session's local workspace. In either case, when the subtransaction terminates, the object is checked back into the local workspace of the session. A nal version of every object that has been updated will eventually be checked back i n to the public database as explained in the remainder of this section.
When a subtransaction succeeds in checking out a version of a lower level object, it is guaranteed that the state of the object so read will never beinvalidated in the future. This is because once a version becomes available for checkout in R mode to higher level subtransactions, we are guaranteed that such a v ersion will never be updated again. To put it another way in transaction processing terminology, a c heckout in R mode will always read committed values of objects. The implication of this is basically that high level subtransactions cannot develop abort dependencies on lower level ones. If such dependencies were possible, then a high level subtransaction would have to abort if a low level subtransaction from which it read, aborts.
We now give two variations of a checkin checkout scheme. They di er basically in how and when objects checked out from the public database are checked back into the public database, for access by other user sessions. They thus o er di erent granularities of interactions across user sessions. These variations can be applied to both conservative and aggressive i n tra-session scheduling strategies. In a level-by-level checkin checkout variation, an object that is updated at a level l by a session, is made visible to another session only when all updates to all objects at level l, b y the session, have been completed. In the second computation-by-computation checkin checkout variation, an object is made visible checked in as soon as all the subtransactions associated with a computation have terminated.
As mentioned before, serializability is not enforced across user sessions. However, a subtransaction in a session will see only committed states of objects that are updated by other sessions. This is ensured by requiring all public checkin operations from a session to be deferred until the root computation in the session terminates. We consider a session to belogically and semantically committed at the point the root computation terminates normally i.e., not due to an error or exception. This guarantees that no abort dependencies will develop across user sessions. The absence of such dependencies ensures that a session A w ould not have to abort because another session B from which it read, aborts.
Level-by-level checkin checkout schemes
The basic idea is to checkin commit objects to the public database, one level at a time. Thus conceptually, we can implement this with processing and propagation of a level-hascommitted message upwards in the security lattice. With a conservative s c heduling scheme, the level-has-committed message can be piggybacked onto the wake-up message. On the other hand, with aggressive s c heduling, the level-has-committed message has to be explicitly propagated. We describe both variations below. The level-by-level checkin checkout scheme can be combined with the conservative scheduling strategy as follows:
1. A subtransaction checks out the required objects from either its session's local workspace, or from the public database the latter if any required object has not been previously checked out by the session. 2. When a subtransaction terminates all checked out objects are checked back in to the session's local workspace. 3. If a wake-up level-has-committed message has been received from all immediate lower levels, and all computations and associated subtransactions at a level say l, have terminated i.e., when the level manager at l nds its local queue to be empty, then the level manager at l checks in the latest versions of all updated objects into the public database. This is followed by step 4.
4. After all updated objects at level l have been checked into the public database, a wake-up level-has-committed message is sent to all immediate higher levels by the local level manager at level l.
In the conservative s c heme above, the receipt of a wake-up level-has-committed message from a lower level is a guarantee that no fork requests will be forthcoming from the lower level. However, in an aggressive level-by-level scheme, this is no longer true. In fact, a level may receive many wake-up messages from a lower level. A level-has-committed message can thus no longer be piggybacked onto a wake-up message, but rather has to be explicitly propagated, starting with the termination of the root computation. In addition to steps 1 and 2 given above for the conservative scheme, we require the following additional steps to achieve this: 3'. When the root computation terminates, we c heck in all updated objects to the public database and send a level-has-committed message to all immediate higher levels. 4'. When a level-has-committed message has been received from all immediate lower levels, and the local level manager nds its queue to be empty, i t c hecks in all updated objects to the public database. The level manager then propagates the level-hascommitted message to its immediate higher levels.
Computation-by-computation checkin checkout schemes
A computation-by-computation checkin checkout scheme releases checks in objects to the public database much earlier in comparison to the level-by-level scheme. Thus on the average, the availability of objects for checkout, across user sessions, is increased as waiting times are reduced. The scheme can be combined again with both conservative and aggressive s c heduling. In either case the basic idea is the same. All objects checked out by a computation the set of subtransactions generated by the computation are checked back into the public database as soon as the computation terminates. Contrast this with the levelby-level checkin scheme where we h a ve to wait for all computations at the associated level to terminate. In other words, when the last subtransaction associated with a computation terminates, all checked out objects are checked back i n to the public database. However for objects checked out in W mode, only the latest version of every object is checked back in. It is obvious that this variation can result in objects being shu ed back and forth from the public database with much greater frequency than the level-by-level scheme.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed an approach to securely and correctly support write-up in terms of abstract operations, within a kernelized architectural framework. Our solution is novel in that it meets the con icting goals secrecy, integrity, and e ciency. The major complication arises due to the non-primitive nature of such operations. We h a ve discussed an asynchronous computational model that calls for concurrent computations to be generated to service RPC-based write-up requests, and a multiversioning approach to synchronizing such concurrent computations. Although our solution is tting for object-oriented databases and cast in that context, it is important to emphasize that it has wider applicability i n a n y environment that needs to support write-up operations. The con dentiality of the scheduling schemes that we have presented is not a concern in a kernelized architecture. However, these scheduling schemes are all inherently secure in that they cannot introduce signaling channels. Hence they can beeasily implemented under architectures that are not truly kernelized i.e., there exists some degree of trust.
In contrasting our work with other proposals for enforcing mandatory security i n m ultilevel object-oriented systems, we note that while they all address con dentiality, the dimension of integrity is largely ignored. Many of the other solutions assume that the TCB provides protection against signaling channels. But how will the TCB do this? Solutions which are implementation dependent are highly vulnerable to the changes and evolution of computer hardware and performance characteristics. Even if timing channels were closed, without synchronization the integrity problem remains unsolved. We believe it is not possible to coin a complete implementation independent solution without the rigor and detail that we h a ve discussed in this paper.
There are several avenues that require further investigation. The multiversioning scheme holds promise for optimizations to reduce the numberofversions that need to beconcurrently maintained within a user session. Some of these optimizations can be trivially implemented. For example, there is no need to create a new version of an object with the issuing of a fork, if the object state has not been updated since the last fork request. Our focus in this paper has been to demonstrate the feasibility of a solution. Any implementation must consider the many optimizations possible.
Our approach to session management does not address the issue of atomicity of user sessions in the presence of failed computations. If we take the view that the actions of individual single-level computations belong to individual subtransactions, then a user session is analogous to what has been referred to in the literature as a multilevel transaction. Such a transaction consists of individual single-level subtransactions. The need for multilevel transactions arises when users have to read and write data classi ed at multiple levels. Perhaps a good example and one given in 18 is a transfer transaction in a bank that transfers money from a low-level account to a higher one. Such a task cannot beaccomplished by a single-level at transaction as mandatory access control rules will not permit it to read and write both accounts. Further, this transfer task has to be atomic. Initial investigations of multilevel transactions can be found in 4, 5 . Perhaps the most signi cant result is the observation in 18 that atomicity and security are con icting properties. This is because ensuring atomicity will always open up covert channels. The authors in 18 argue for a compromise that limits the bandwidth of such c hannels in the course of ensuring atomicity.
Closely connected with the above atomicity requirement is the issue of recovery itself, within the context of object-oriented systems and applications. In order to incorporate recovery management semantics into our computational model, we w ould have to consider the distributed nature of computations as well as the implications of multilevel security. Some of the speci c issues questions that need to be addressed include: a How can distributed recovery be incorporated and managed? b How can we handle recovery at high levels without interference to lower level computations? c What are goodgranularities for recovery units? Is it a transaction? Is it the state of an object? d Can we provide variable granularities of recovery units, so that the amount of loss of work that is tolerable, can be tailored to individual application needs?
A performance evaluation of the various scheduling schemes for computations with varying input-output I O and CPU demands would be interesting. Also interesting is the potential to exploit intra-level concurrency. In both the conservative and aggressive s c heduling schemes, there exists only one active computation at a security level, at any given time. This restriction may berelaxed at the cost of managing intra-level con icts and concurrency. In particular, updates from multiple concurrent computations at the same level may have to beserialized at object boundaries. Alternatively, object level semantics may beexploited to allow non-serializable behavior. Such enhancements will impact the level manager algorithms.
The hierarchical model of transactions highlighted in this paper is indeed a primitive one. In particular, it is tightly coupled to our asynchronous computational model. A more advanced object sharing and transaction model should re ect at a more semantic level, the various models of user activity and cooperation in multilevel secure systems such transaction models for non-secure environments are discussed in 1, 10 . Also, such a transaction model should appear from a user's perspective, to be independent of our underlying asynchronous computational model. Implementing this may naturally lead to a layered transaction scheme, with the higher semantic layer mapped to a lower layer that re ects the underlying computational model. Another direction worth investigating is a hierarchical model of transactions de ned across all user sessions, and to extend the aggressive s c heduling strategy across the computations in the various sessions. However, the algorithms in the current form would allow one active session per security level. Hence these algorithms would have to be extended to distinguish computations originating from various sessions as well as to exploit more intra-level concurrency.
